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STATE REGULATION OF ALIEN LAND

OWNERSHIP
WILLIAM B. FIsCH*

In the 1970's, due to a number of factors only one of which is the
new-found wealth of the oil-producing nations, the volume of foreign
direct investment in the United States has increased dramatically.' The
magnitude of this capital inflow, while it is doubtless beneficial in many
respects, has caused widespread alarm over the possibility of a loss of
economic sovereignty. Over the last several years efforts have been made
to establish a national system of control over such investment. These
efforts are continuing, but so far without conspicuous success.2
An increasingly popular vehicle for foreign investment is land, including both developed and agricultural acreage. 3 As a result the hue
and cry has once again been raised in state legislatures against alien
ownership of real estate. Although the debate over legislative proposals
* Isador Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B.
1957, Harvard College; LL.B. 1960, University of Illinois; M. Comp. L. 1962,
University of Chicago; Dr. jur. 1972, University of Freiburg, Germany. Portions
of the research for this paper were done with the assistance of a stipend from
the University of Missouri-Columbia Law School Foundation, for which I wish to
express my gratitude.
1. See, e.g., Friedman, N.Y. Times News Service, published in the Columbia
(Mo.) Missourian, Feb. 16, 1975, at 9, col. 1. More recently, it has been noted
that such purchases, specifically land, have been made largely by Europeans. See
BUSINESS WEEK, March 27, 1978, at 79-80.
2. See note I supra. In 1 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO THE 'CONGRESS,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 240 (1976), made pursuant
to the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1450.(1974), the Department of Commerce recommended against comprehensive controls. For a discussion of earlier unsuccessful proposals, see Fenton, Proposed Limitations on Alien
Purchases of United States Securities, 9 J. INT. L. & ECON. 267 (1974).
3. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, March 27, 1978, at 79-80; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 7, 1977, at 8A, col. 8; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Sept. 2, 1977, at
18A, col. 1. Accurate statistics are hard to obtain, but, as BusINEss WEEK reports,
the U.S. General Accounting Office is engaged in a survey for the Senate Agriculture Committee to evaluate the magnitude of land purchases by aliens.
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to limit such ownership has quite properly emphasized their economic,
political and social consequences, 4 the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States collectively impose severe limitations on the power of
the states to act in this field which might render such legislation invalid.
Over half of the states still have on the books some form of restriction on alien land ownership, principally leftovers from a number of
earlier waves of anti-alien sentiment in American history. 5 In the Midwest, as one might expect, recent attention has been focused specifically
on agricultural land. In 1977, for example, Minnesota revised its existing
law to make restrictions applicable only to agricultural land.6 Missouri,
which had repealed its previous alien land law in 1965 to make way for a
significant foreign investment,7 has now rejoined the anti-alien ownership camp. After a bill aimed at broad restrictions failed in a previous
session of the General Assembly,8 the current session has passed a law
restricting ownership of agricultural land by nonresident aliens.9
The validity and usefulness of such proposals are subject to question
in light of constitutional and treaty limitations. These limitations have
taken two major forms: direct constitutional limitations under the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and
indirect limitations imposed by actual or potential exercise of federal
authority under the treaty-making power, Congress' powers to regulate
foreign commerce and to provide for a uniform rule of naturalization,
and the general power of the federal government to conduct foreign
affairs. It is appropriate to begin with a sketch of the principal patterns
of restriction exhibited by existing state laws.
I.

PATTERNS

OF

ExISTING STATE REGULATION

1

o

A. In General
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the prevailing common
law rule, derived from English feudalism, was that aliens as such were
4. See, e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1978, at 6B, col. 1 (reporting
debate in the Missouri Senate).
5. See Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60
MINN. L. REV. 621, 623-29 (1976); Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-evaluation, 36
TEMP. L.Q. 15, 26-34 (1962).
6. 1977 Minn. Laws, ch. 269, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 (Supp. 1978).
7. 1965 Mo. Laws at 632. See note 47 infra.
8. H.R. 972, 78th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1975). That bill would have
prohibited all foreign government-corporations from owning Missouri real estate
and would have prohibited any corporation controlled by aliens or foreign governments from doing business in the state. It died in committee in the House.
9. Senate Substitute for S. 685, 79th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978),
(approved April 28, 1978) amending § 442.560, RSMo 1969. The text of the bill
is set forth as an appendix to this article.
10. For detailed surveys of state alien land laws, see Morrison, supra note 5;
Sullivan, supra note 5; Note, Foreign Investment in U.S. Realty, 28 FLA. L. REv. 491
(1976); Note, State Regulation of ForeignInvestment, 9 CORNELL INT. L.J. 83 (1975).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1
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disabled from holding land either by purchase or descent; "1 their title
was subject to defeasance by escheat in the case of purchase, 2 or was
void altogether in the case of descent.' 3 At one time or another every
American jurisdiction has adopted some constitutional or statutory provision dealing with the subject. England herself abolished the rule by
statute in 1870,'14 but the dominant view in the United States has been
that the common law rule remains residually applicable absent complete
positive regulation.' 5 Among common law states, only Vermont appears
to have rejected the rule by case law, on the persuasive rationale that the
common law rule was based on feudal obligations of fealty to the king,
whereas American titles are allodial and imply no such obligation.'" It
appears that the only other American jurisdiction to reject the common
law rule without statute is Louisiana, which of course claims a civil law
heritage.'

7

Eighteen jurisdictions now have constitutional or statutory provisions
expressly abolishing the distinction between aliens and citizens concerning the right to take and hold real estate.18 The remaining thirty-two
11. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *249.
12.
The case of an alien born is also peculiar; for he may purchase any
thing; but after purchase he can hold nothing except a lease for years

of a house for convenience of merchandise, in case he be an alien
friend; all other purchases (when found by an inquest of office) being
immediately forfeited to the crown.
Id. at *293 (emphasis in original). 2b E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON
(1853).
In England it appears that the alien, holding a defeasible title, could not
convey any more than that, and the purchaser from an alien also was subject to an
inquest of office. See 2b E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON (1853); Sulli-

van, supra note 5 at 16. In the United States, however, the prevailing view has
been that the state's power to declare escheat exists only so long as the alien
himself holds the property. See Estate of Wilson, 195 Neb. 228, 230, 237 N.W.2d
835, 837 (1976) (the right of escheat expires on the death of the alien unless his
heirs are also ineligible).
13. "Aliens, also, are incapable of taking by descent .
2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *249 (emphasis added).

14. Naturalization Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 14 § 2.
15. E.g., Fairfax v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813);
Donaldson v. State, 182 Ind. 615, 101 N.E. 485 (1913); Pembroke v. Huston, 180
Mo. 627, 79 S.W. 470 (1904); Stokes v. O'Fallon, 2 Mo. 32 (1828); 2 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES *54, *61-63.
16. State v. Boston, C. & M.R.R., 25 Vt. 433 (1853) (dictum).
17. See Succession of Herdman, 154 La. 477, 482, 97 So. 664, 665 (1923).
18. Alabama: ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 1 (1958); California: CAL. CONST. art. I, §
21; CAL. CIV. CODE § 671 (West 1954); Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-112
(1973); Delaware: DEL. CODE tit. 25, §§ 306-308 (1975), tit. 12, § 507 (1974);
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE §§ 19-321, 45-1501 (1973); Maine: ME. REv.
STAT. tit. 33, § 451 (1978); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 184, § 1 (1977);
Michigan: MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 6; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.135 (1967); New
Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-1-24 (1961); 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 257, § 2-112;
New York: N.Y. [REAL PROP.) Law §§ 10(2), 15, 16 (McKinney 1968); North
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show a bewildering variety of express or residual restrictions which
cluster around one or more of the following factors: (a) the manner of
source of acquisition (descent, 19 purchase, 20 from the state 21); (b) the
nature of the holding (agricultural 22 or rural,2 3 or size of holding 24); (c)
the status of the alien (nonresident of the state, 25 nonresident of the
28
27
United States, 26 nondeclarant immigrant, ineligible for citizenship,

Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-11 (1960); Ohio: OHo REV. CODE ANN. §
2105.16 (Page 1976); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-2-1 (1969); South
Dakota: S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-2-9, 2-112 (1967); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 64-201 (1976), §§ 31-401, 31-402 (1977); Texas: TEx. [Civ.] CODE
ANN. tit. 166a (Vernon 1969) TEX. [PROB.] CODE ANN. § 41(c) (Vernon 1956);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.16.005 (1967); West Virginia: W. VA.
CODE § 36-1-21 (1966).
19. At least two jurisdictions retain some limitation on inheritance, while removing disability regarding purchase. NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.055 (1965) (taking
in general, § 134.230 (1957) (descent, reciprocity); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 6401, 64-2
(purchase), 64-3, to -5 (1975) (inheritance, reciprocity for nonresident).
20. At least two jurisdictions appear to limit purchase, while removing limits
on inheritance. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2104(8), 2518 (1975) (inheritance); 68 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 32 (1965) (purchase limited to 5,000 acres); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
710.01, 710.02 (West 1969) (nonresidents).
21. Five jurisdictions place some rqstriction specifically on acquisition of state
lands: ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190(4) (1977) (reciprocity required for mineral
rights); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 10-926 (1976) (citizenship required to take tax-forfeited land); IDAHO CODE § 58-313 (1976) (no sale of state land to non-declarant
aliens); Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-75 (1972); OR. REV. STAT. § 273.255 (1975) (only
declarant aliens may apply to purchase state lands).
22. See MINN. STAT. § 500.221 (Supp. 1977).
23. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1 (1974) (limit of 640 acres outside of corporate limits of any town or city); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-414 (1976) (within 3 miles
of corporate limits of towns and villages).
24. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-2 (Burns 1973) (over 320 acres); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 567.1 (1974) (over 640 acres); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 32 (1965) (5,000
acres); S.C. CODE § 27-13-30 (1976) (500,000 acres); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02
(1969) (640 acres).
25. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 122 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.20
(1968).
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-57 (West Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE §
567.8 (1951); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-402
(1943) (interpreted in Estate of James, 192 Neb. 614, 223 N.W.2d 481 (1974));
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (1969).
27. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.290 (1972).
28. This was the formula used in the anti-oriental legislation of the 1910's
and 1920's, subsequently declared unconstitutional by several states. Its California history is tellingly recounted by Justice Murphy concurring in Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 651 (1947). Arizona retains such a provision. ARIZ.
REv. STAT. § 33-1201 (1974). See Lowe, The Arizona Alien Land Law: Its Meaning
and ConstitutionalValidity, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253. Wyoming also has such a provision. Wyo. STAT. § 34-151 (1967) (inheritance). Under present immigration
laws the category no longer has racial significance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1
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citizen of a nation not affording reciprocal rights, 9 enemy alien 30); (d)
the remedy for a prohibited holding (escheat"' or mandatory alienation
within a specified period of time 32); (e) special conditions attached to an
otherwise permissible holding (registration 33 or continuation of a particular use 34).
B. The Missouri Experience
The volatility of these regulations over two centuries may be illustrated by an examination of the Missouri experience. In 1816 the territorial legislature of Missouri adopted the common law of England as
rules of decision absent contrary legislation. 35 In 1820 Missouri's first
state legislature granted rights regarding realty, equal to those of citizens, to aliens who resided in the United States or its territories and had
declared their intention to become citizens of the United States.3 6 In
1828 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a nondeclarant alien widow
could take dower on the basis of the unqualified reference to "widows"
in the dower statute, there being no political reason in Missouri to read

29. This is the formula used in many of the so-called "Iron Curtain" statutes,
dealing with inheritance by aliens and stemming from the Cold War. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190(4) (1977); IOwA CODE § 567.8 (1951); KAN. STAT. §
59-511 (1976); MONT. REV. CODE § 91-520 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §
4-107 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.230 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 64-3

to -5 (1975); Wyo. STAT. § 34-151 (1967).
30. Six states purport to remove common-law disabilities only for aliens who
are not enemies. 1962 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 062-105; GA. CODE ANN. § 79-303
(1973); Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.290 (1972); MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 14-101
(1974); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 22 (Purdon 1965); VA. CODE § 55-1 (1950).
31. Historically, this has been the normal remedy. See note 12 supra; authorities cited note 15 supra. See, e.g., Axuz. REv. STAT. § 33-1206 (1974); IoWA
CODE § 567.8 (1951); KAN. STAT. § 58-2238 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
381.300 (1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-408
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.250 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-5 (1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (1969); Wyo. STAT. § 2-43.1 (Supp. 1975).
32. At least eight states impose time limits for holdings by certain aliens. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 6, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1976) (6 years); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-7-2,
-8-2 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1 (Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. §§
381.320 (1972) (21 years for resident aliens), .330 (8 years for nonresident
aliens); MINN. STAT. § 500.221 (Supp. 1977) (1 year, followed by judicial sale);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-411 (1976) (holding via lien, 10 years); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 122 (1971); S.C. CODE § 27-13-30 (1976).

33. See IOwA CODE ANN. § 567.9 (Supp. 1977) (requires reports from nonresident aliens owning, or leasing agricultural land or farming outside city
limits); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 (Supp. 1977) (requires nonresident aliens
who already hold title to agricultural land to file annual reports).
34. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-58 (1960) (allowing nonresident aliens
to acquire land for mining or quarrying, but limiting the holding of such land

without such use to 10 years).
35. 1816 Mo. Terr. Laws, ch. 154.
36. 1820 Mo. Laws, ch. 284.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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any qualification into the statute or to insist on applying the English rule
37
merely because it was not expressly overruled.
In 1835 the legislature extended the right to take and convey realty
by descent or devise to all aliens resident within the state, but apparently
withheld this right from aliens resident in the territories of the United
States even though declarant. 3 In 1845 the right to hold realty as well
as take and convey was included. 39 In 1855 nonresident aliens, who
were still ineligible to own property by terms of the 1835 law, were authorized to sell and convey property acquired by devise or descent within
three years after their decedent's death; 40 later in the same year the
time was extended to three years after final settlement of the decedent's
estate. 4 1 In 1872 a statute was adopted which abolished altogether the
distinction between aliens and citizens regarding real estate ownership
42
and disposition.
In 1895, in a period of anti-alien sentiment in the farm states, 43 the
legislature made it unlawful for nondeclarant aliens or foreign-country
corporations to acquire or hold realty except by inheritance or by way of
judicial collection of debts. It was also unlawful for any corporation
more than twenty percent of whose stock was owned by aliens to acquire
,or hold realty by any means; the law also provided for forfeiture of land
improperly held. 4 4 However, this was modified in 1897 to permit aliens
or alien-owned corporations to acquire security interests in realty and to
purchase at foreclosure sales, provided interests so purchased were
45
alienated to citizens within six years.
Finally, in 1965 the legislature adopted a provision 41 which in effect
restored the situation first established in 1872. This was apparently done
47
in part to accommodate a specific prospective investment.
37. Stokes v. O'Fallon, 2 Mo. 32 (1828).
38. RSMo 1835, at 66.
39. RSMo 1845, ch. 6, § 1, at 113.
40. 1855 Mo. Laws at 4.
41. RSMo 1855, ch. 5.
42. 1871 Mo. Laws at 79.
43. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 30-32.
44. 1895 Mo. Laws at 207-08.
45. 1897 Mo. Laws at 144. The 5 year limit in this act was extended to 6
years in § 4765, RSMo 1899.
46. Section 422.560, RSMo 1969 provided:
Persons not citizens of the United States and corporations not created
by or under the laws of the United States or of some state or territory
of the United States shall be capable of acquiring, by grant, purchase,
devise or descent, real estate, or any interest therein, in this state, and
of owning, holding, devising, or alienating the same, and shall incur
the like duties and liabilities in relation thereto as if they were citizens
of the United States and residents of this state.
47. See St. Louis Globe-Democrat, May 27, 1965, at 7C, col. 9 (report of the
signing of the bill which would "allow alien-owned corporations like Dutch Shell
Oil Company to own real estate in Missouri").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1
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Missouri Senate Bill 685 48 amends the existing law by excepting agricultural land from the general authorization for aliens and foreigncountry corporations to own land. It then expressly prohibits the acquisition of agricultural land, either directly or through business entities, by
aliens who are neither citizens nor residents of the United States or its
territories. 49 "Agricultural land" is defined essentially as land consisting
of more than five acres and capable of supporting an agricultural enterprise.50 Acquisition of such land is nonetheless permitted for nonfarming purposes; 51 the acquirer must in such case file a declaration of
intent regarding use of the land.5 2 If a filing is made, farming can be
pursued pending development, either by the filing acquirer or by
another person under lease. 53 If land is improperly acquired or a permissible use discontinued, the attorney general must institute an action
to require the acquirer to divest himself of the land within two years;
failing such divestiture, the land is to be sold at public auction as if pur5 4
suant to mortgage foreclosure.
Proponents of this and similar bills have offered at least three
different reasons for their enactment: (1) that nonresident aliens are
paying such high prices for farmland that the Missouri farmer cannot
afford to outbid them; 5 5 (2) that foreigners would not necessarily use
the land-particularly in a prospective time of food scarcity-in the best
interest of Missourians; 56 and (3) that the bills would "help preserve our
family farm system." 57 Registration of otherwise permissible alien acquisitions is presumably intended to provide information as to the extent
of foreign ownership 58 as well as to facilitate enforcement.
Regardless of whether it served as a model for one or more of the
Missouri bills, the similarity between the 1977 Minnesota law 59 and the
1978 Missouri law is worth noting. The Minnesota provision also applies
only to agricultural land, defined as land "capable of use in the production" of agricultural products, 60 and prohibits acquisition thereof by an

48. See appendix infra.
49. Senate Substitute for S.685, supra note 9, § 3.
50. Id. § 2(1).
51. Id. § 7.1.
52. Id. § 7.2.
53. Id. § 7(1).
54. Id. § 4.
55. E.g., St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Sept. 2, 1977, at 18A, col. 4 (quoting the
state director of agriculture).
56. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1978, at 6B, col. 7 (quoting Rep.
Osbourn, sponsor of one of the house bills).
57. Id. (quoting Rep. Novinger).
58. Cf. note 3 supra (foreign ownership statistics).
59. 1977 Minn. Laws, ch. 269.
60. Id. § 1.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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alien not permanently resident in the United States, or by any business
entity not at least eighty percent owned by United States citizens or
permanent residents.6 As with the Missouri bills, forced sale is used
rather than escheat to provide the remedy.62 The prohibition is against
acquisition, rather than holding; however, persons holding land as of the
effective date of the law, the future acquisition of which would have
been prohibited by the law, are required to register and file annual in63
formational reports.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:

EQUAL

PROTECTION

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
federal Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any State ...deny to any per64
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Both aliens
and corporations 65 have long since been held to be "persons" within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment generally and the equal protection clause in particular, so that this criterion is met by those against
whom the alien land laws discriminate.
It has been argued that the equal protection clause does not protect
a nonresident alien, because such a person-not being physically within
the state's borders-is not "within its jurisdiction."6 6 There are in fact
several different possible interpretations of that phrase; the two most
obvious are "physically present within its borders," and "subject to its
laws or adjudicatory authority." However, even if it is assumed that
physical presence is meant, it is clear that a person can be physically
present within a state's borders without being a resident thereof. A statute which prohibited a person from purchasing land while present in the
state, merely because he was not a resident of the state or of the United
6 7
States, would therefore come within the equal protection clause.
The use of the term 'Jurisdiction," on the other hand, suggests the
broader meaning "subject to its laws," and it might be supposed that the
fact of the prohibition against acquiring or holding land is itself an exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident, nonpresent alien. 6s Histori-

61. Id. § 2.
62. Id. § 3.
63. Id. § 4.
64. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
65. E.g., Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
66. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 877 (1975); Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Neb. 1971),
aff'd mem., 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Liebman & Levine, Foreign Investors and Equal
Protection, 27 MERCER L. REv. 615, 618-19 (1976).

67. See Sailer v. Tonkin, 356 F. Supp. 72 (D.V.I. 1973); Liebman & Levine,
supra note 66, at 618; Lowe, supra note 28, at 263 n.57; Morrison, supra note 5,
at 642.
68. See authorities cited note 67 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1
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cally, however, it must be presumed that the term 'jurisdiction" as used
in the fourteenth amendment would incorporate the distinction between
jurisdiction in personam and jurisdiction in rem, already firmly established
when expounded by the Supreme Court in 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff.6 9 In
that light, the phrase "person within its jurisdiction" can be seen as most
likely intended to refer to personal jurisdiction, not established merely by
the existence of a claim to or interest in property within the state's borders. That the distinction between these forms of jurisdiction may have
been rendered archaic under recent due process analysis 7 0 does not
necessarily destroy its usefulness in determining the proper scope of
equal protection analysis.
Assuming that the equal protection clause is to be applied, the question remains what standard of review is to be applied to discrimination
against aliens. Two interlocking lines of cases involving legislative classifications based on alienage have applied the highest standard of judicial review, referred to as "strict scrutiny." 71 The first line of cases
deals with classifications based on alienage as such, restricting the right
of aliens to earn a livelihood in various occupations or to receive various
economic benefits from the state. Truax v. Raich 72 struck down a limitation on the proportion which aliens could constitute in any employer's
work force. Other cases have held unconstitutional the exclusions of
aliens from competitive civil service; 73 the exclusion of aliens from the
practice of law; 7 4 and the exclusion of aliens from licensure to practice
civil engineering.75 The Supreme Court has held it impermissible to
deny welfare benefits to aliens,7 6 or to deny nondeclarant aliens state
financial aid for higher education.7 7 In these cases, aliens were found
to be "a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority ... for whom
Discrimination
... heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."s7
69. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
70. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
71. E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-6 (1978).
72. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
73. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). Sugarman effectively overruled
Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) and Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915), involving public works employment.
74. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Grifffths effectively overruled Clarke
v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (pool hall licenses). See also Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1972); Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971). Florida's citizenship
requirement for applicants for letters of administration of estates was struck
down in Estate of Fernandez, 335 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1976).
75. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). See also Surmeli
v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 560 (2d
Cir. 1976) (medical doctors); Nonvick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (public school teachers).
76. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
77. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
78. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
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against them is sustainable only if necessary to the accomplishment or
protection of a permissible and substantial purpose or interest.79 At the
same time, however, the Court recognized limits to the right of equal
treatment in the rights of the state to establish its own form of government and define its political community"0 and to limit to citizens "high
public offices that have to do with the formulation and execution of state
policy.""' Accordingly, after having summarily refused to overturn decisions sustaining citizenship requirements for jury duty8 2 and voting in
local elections, 3 the Court this year held it permissible to exclude aliens
84
from New York's State Highway Patrol.
The second line of cases has dealt with land or other natural resources, and with classifications based not only on alienage as such, but
also upon a subclass of aliens, those ineligible for citizenship. In Terrace
v. Thompson, s 5 decided at the peak of anti-Japanese sentiment in 1923,
the Supreme Court upheld a Washington statute prohibiting nondeclarant aliens from owning non-mineral lands unless acquired by inheritance, finding the distinction between aliens and citizens real and pertinent to the legislative purpose. The fact that under the then existing
immigration laws orientals were ineligible for citizenship was disregarded, because that was the federal government's own discrimination.
In the same week the Court sustained California statutes based expressly
on ineligibility for citizenship. 6 In 1948 in Oyama v. California,8 7 the
Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply to a citizen the California statute's presumption that if an ineligible alien supplied the consideration for another's purchase, it was done with intent to evade the prohibition. Because by that time virtually only Japanese were ineligible for
citizenship under federal law, escheat of the land held in the defendant
son's -name would be based solely on his alien father's nationality. This
scheme was struck down as an impermissible racial discrimination against
79. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
80. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973).
81. Id.
82. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd mem., 426 U.S.
913 (1976).
83. Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961
(1977). Cf Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vole?, 75

Mich. L. Rev. 1092 (1977), who acknowledges authorities to this effect but argues

for the opposite policy.
84. Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978). The three dissenters represented by Justice Stevens were unable to distinguish state troopers from
lawyers who were held to be not sufficiently official in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973). Cf Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (invalidating a citizenship requirement for peace officers).
85. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
86. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
(1923); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923).
87. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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a citizen. Four of the justices voting for the majority would have held the
statutory classification to be based upon race and therefore unconstitutional on its face. 8s A few months later, in Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission 9 the Court invalidated a Washington law excluding ineligible
aliens from commercial fishing licenses, characterizing the activity as
"earning a living" and rejecting the state's claim to a special interest in
preserving natural resources for its citizens. On the strength of these
92
91
90
decisions, the supreme courts of Oregon, California, and Montana
invalidated their alien land laws which disqualified aliens who were ineligible for citizenship.
Both of these lines of cases involved resident aliens, lawfully admitted
for residence by the immigration authorities and resident in the discriminating state. The obvious question then is whether these cases have
any bearing on statutes, such as those of Minnesota 93 and Missouri,
which apply only to aliens not resident in the United States.
Aside from the argument noted above, that the equal protection
clause does not apply to such aliens at all, the principal alternative is to
hold that "nonresident alien," as distinguished from "alien," is not a suspect classification, and is therefore subject to a lesser standard of review.
This is the position taken in 1976 by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren,9 4 which applied a lesser standard of review to the Wisconsin statute disqualifying nonresident aliens from
owning land in the state. Whatever the position of aliens resident in the
United States seeking to earn a living, a class which includes over ninety
percent of the world's population can scarcely be a "discrete and insular
minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." This
notion is strengthened because, by hypothesis, only investment is at
stake, not the means of earning a living. To be sure, the nonresident
alien is just as much excluded from the relevant political community as
the resident, if not more so, and has even less opportunity to influence
directly the decisions affecting his interests. However, the nonresident's
stake in the community is correspondingly limited, and he is much more
likely than the resident alien to have the countervailing diplomatic support of his home government. 95 "Heightened judicial solicitude" seems
therefore less necessary.
If the lesser standard of "minimum rationality" 96 applies, it is highly
likely that such statutes would pass muster, as the Wisconsin court held.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 647 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 650 (Murphy, J., concurring).
334 U.S. 410 (1948).
Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
State v. Oakland, 129 Mont. 347, 287 P.2d 39 (1955).
MINN. STAT. § 500.221 (1977). See also statutes cited note 26 supra.
74 Wis. 2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
See Morrison supra note 5, at 642-43.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2 (1978).
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Not only does the exclusion of aliens from land ownership have a long
common law history, but it is at least rational to conclude that absentee
ownership of land is "potentially detrimental to the welfare of the community ...and persons who are neither citizens nor residents are least
likely to consider the welfare of the community... .",97

On the other hand, if the strict standard of review applies, restrictions on nonresident alien ownership of land cannot be expected to
stand. Ownership of land scarcely rises to the level of membership in the
political community; it is no longer permissible to make such ownership
a condition of the franchise in elections of general interest. 98 Moreover,
exclusion of nonresident aliens, as distinguished from nonresident
United States citizens, cannot be said to be necessary to the protection of
any of the interests claimed to lie behind restrictions on ownership of
agricultural land (control of prices, control of disposition of crops, preservation of the family farm). 99 All of those interests are susceptible of
more direct protection ' 00 and the protective urge of the nonresident
citizen is at best speculative.
However, one provision of the Missouri law may pose serious equal
protection problems, even under the lower standard. Section 4(3) of that
law, after establishing the general two-year period for divestiture after
judicial order, contains the following proviso: "Provided, however, an
incorporated foreign business must divest itself of agricultural land
within the minimum time required by Article XI, Section 5, of the Missouri constitution." The constitutional provision referred to prohibits
corporations from owning real estate except as necessary and proper for
carrying on their legitimate business, but permits them to hold real estate acquired in payment of a debt for at least ten years. 10 1 The proviso
in the land law is ambiguous at best and may have been intended simply
to provide for a different time period for acquisition of land in payment
of a debt.'0 2 However, only the time period is incorporated by reference, not the manner of acquisition specified in the constitutional provision. In any case, the proviso applies only to corporations, not to individuals or unincorporated business entities. Therefore, the effect of the
proviso may be to establish a ten-year divestiture period for foreign corporations, regardless of the mode of acquisition, while unincorporated
aliens must divest within two years. No rational basis appears for such a
97. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren, 246 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Wis. 1976). See
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 19, 1978, at 6B, col. 1 (argument of Rep. Osbourn
in support of one of the Missouri bills).
98. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); L. TIUBE, supra note 96 § 13-11.
99. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
100. E.g., Missouri Farming Corporation Law, §§ 350.010-.030, RSMo (Supp.
1975) (limiting the power of corporations to engage in farming).
101. Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
102. See Columbia Missourian, Apr. 14, 1978, at 14, col. 1; Columbia Missourian, Apr. 15, 1978, at 14, col. 1 (comments by legislators after passage of the bill
in the House and Senate).
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distinction; if there is none the provision must fail. Moreover, by virtue
of a rather unusual indivisibility clause added on the floor of the House
on the day of passage, if any provision of the law is found unconstitutional the entire law is to be invalid.' 0 3
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: DUE

PROCESS

Unlike the equal protection clause, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is not limited to persons "within the jurisdiction"
of the state. Therefore, to the extent that a nonresident alien has property interests in the state, he is entitled to due process protection. There
can be no doubt that the nonresident alien who purchases land has a
property right, even though the purchase is formally prohibited. Under
both the American common law 104 and statutes such as the old Missouri
Alien Land Law 105 an alien could take by purchase, could defend his
right against any person other than the state, and could convey good
title to a citizen before the state began proceedings to declare an escheat.1 0 6 Practice in the pursuit of escheat was so lax in most states that
the alien could expect to enjoy the purchase virtually unmolested. 0 7 The
1978 Missouri law clearly follows this pattern by providing for mandatory divestiture rather than escheat as the remedy for a prohibited holding, and that only after action by the attorney general.' 0 8
Due process may be seen as having two aspects: first, as a source of
a standard of review for the state's legislative classification; and second,
as the basis for a potential claim to a right of compensation from the
state.
The due process standard of review requires that a state's law have a
purpose which bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.109 This is, in effect, the same standard applied to nonsuspect clas103. Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 685, supra note 9, § 7(1). The only interpretation of the proviso that appears to be available which would avoid this
equal protection problem is that it was merely intended to forestall any extension

by this law of the time period specified in the constitutional provision for
divestiture by a corporation of real estate acquired in payment of a debt, but not
otherwise necessary or proper to its legitimate business. The constitution permits
extension by general law, and because the 2-year period in the land law runs
only from the date of the judicial divestiture order, it could run more than 10

years past the date of acquisition. By that reasoning, the proviso should be read
simply to require a corporation to comply with the 10-year period specified in
the constitution, if applicable, even if that would leave less than two years after
the divestiture order.
104. See note 12 supra.
105. Pembroke v. Huston, 180 Mo. 627, 79 S.W. 470 (1904).

106. Id.
107. See, e.g., M.

GILL, TREATISE ON REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MISSOURI

94-95

(1949).

108. See Senate Substitute for S. 685, supra note 9, § 4.
109. Morrison, supra note 5, at 645.
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sifications under the equal protection clause and serves only to protect
against arbitrary or capricious laws. As indicated above, under this standard there is no apparent basis for invalidating a law prohibiting nonresident aliens from owning land.
Even if a taking of property is not arbitrary or capricious, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporates the fifth
amendment's obligation to provide compensation for a taking of property for public use. 1 0 To the extent that a state's enforcement of alien
land laws deprives aliens of their property, therefore, it might be argued
that the state is obligated to compensate them for any loss incurred."'
A number of states have recognized this claim as at least persuasive
by providing for compensation in the case of escheat 1 2 or by providing,
in lieu of escheat, for a period of time within which the alien may dispose of the land on the real estate market.11 3 In either of these cases,
the alien presumably receives market value for the property, and the
obligation of the state to compensate either does not arise or is satisfied.
If judicial sale is imposed upon failure to divest within the statutory
period, as in the Missouri and Minnesota laws, it might be argued that
the resulting compensation is likely not to represent fair market value,
and that there has therefore been a taking to the extent of the difference. The United States Supreme Court has dealt with this issue in Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 1 4 a 1945 decision sustaining the North
Dakota corporate farm law as applied to land acquired by a corporation
before enactment of the law. The statute gave the corporation ten years
in which to dispose of the property, then required judicial sale with the
proceeds to be paid to the corporation The corporation argued that prevailing conditions did not permit recapture of the original investment.
The Supreme Court held that due process requires only an opportunity to
realize market value, which the ten-year period provided. Although the
two-year period established in the Missouri law might be thought less
adequate for that purpose, especially because it will be known to any
prospective buyer through recording of the divestiture order that the
seller is under compulsion of a time limit,"15 there is no reason to suppose that the holding of Asbuy Hospital will be abandoned.
If the remedy for prohibited acquisition or failure to divest is escheat, with proceeds retained by the state, the argument that there has
been a taking seems stronger. On the one hand, it is generally said that
escheat in the context of alien land laws or inheritance statutes is in the
110. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
111. See Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1341 (1971) (Van Pelt, J.,
dissenting).
112. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-408 (1976).
113. See statutes cited note 32 supra.
114. 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
115. Senate Substitute for S. 685, supra note 9, § 4(3).
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nature of a forfeiture for wrongful holding.1

6

It is settled, at least in

the case of a forfeiture of contraband or property involved in the commission of a crime, that there is no obligation to compensate. 17 On the
other hand, because the state's right to escheat derives from its position
as ultimate owner of all land, this would seem to be a fairly good example of a taking by the state as proprietor or enterpriser, said in more
recent analyses to be the paradigm of compensable expropriation."" No
case has been found holding that a duty to compensate in such cases
exists independent of statute.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL SUBORDINATION TO FEDERAL AUTHORITY

In addition to the direct restraints placed on state legislative activity
by the fourteenth amendment, the supremacy clause of article VI of the
federal Constitution provides a vehicle for indirect restraints through the
actual or potential exercise of authority or by the federal government.
State laws may be superseded by treaties, by comprehensive and therefore preemptive federal legislation, or by conflict with the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. It is these restraints
which provide the most serious obstacle to effective state regulation of
alien land ownership.
A. Treaties
It has been settled since Missouri v. Holland" 9 that valid treaties
supersede state law, even in areas which the federal government has
otherwise left to the states. Conflict with treaty rights is therefore among
the most common defenses to enforcement of alien land laws. The difficulty, however, is that treaties seldom provide an effective defense,
particularly to the sort of law now contemplated in Missouri. Even the
extensive series of bilateral treaties on friendship, commerce and navigation, which deal with many aspects of foreign investment, normally do
not provide a citizen of one country a general right to own land in the

116. See, e.g., 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *293; Takiguchi v. State, 47
Ariz. 302, 55 P.2d 802 (1936) (denying injunctive relief where the same proof
would establish escheat and criminal liability); Rippeth v. Connelly, 60 Tenn.
App. 430, 447 S.W.2d 380 (1969) (citing analogy to forfeiture as the reason for
the rule that escheats are not favored in law). Some statutes use the term "forfeit" or "forfeiture" in connection with escheat provisions: IOWA CODE ANN. §
567.1 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-408
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 710.02 (1969).

117. See McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
118. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1964). Seven
years later the same author conceded that the cases have not yet settled on a
consistent theory. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971).
119. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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other country.12 ° In lieu of a comprehensive survey of these treaties, a
few examples will suffice to indicate the limits of their applicability to
this problem.
The 1950 treaty with Ireland 121 provides nationals of each party a
right to enter the territory of the other for the purpose of carrying on
trade and related commercial activities, on a most-favored-nation
bases; 122 a right to national treatment 123 with respect to recovery for
personal injury, death, or work-related injury, and regarding compulsory insurance systems; a right to equitable treatment for capital; a right
to national treatment for engaging in economic and cultural activities,
obtaining protection for industrial property, and access to courts and
tribunals. In article VII,

24

however, which deals with ownership of

property, more or less standard common law limitations on alien ownership are left intact. Nationals of one party are to be given national
treatment in the other with respect to the acquisition of property by succession or through judicial process, but may be ineligible to hold such
property, and in such case are to be given only a reasonable time in
which to dispose of it in the normal manner at market value. Otherwise,
they are subject to local law concerning ownership of real property, ex-

120. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 656, 660.
121. [1950] 1 U.S.T. 788, T.I.A.S. No. 2155.
122. Defined as "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon
terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to
nationals ... of any third country." [1950] 1 U.S.T. 788, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 art.
XXI(2).
123. Defined as "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon
terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situations, to
nationals ... of such Party." [1950] 1 U.S.T. 788, T.I.A.S.'No. 2155 art. XXI(l).
124.
I. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment within the territories of the other Party with respect to acquiring all kinds of property by testate or intestate succession or
through judicial process. Should they because of their alienage be ineligible to continue to own any such property, they shall be allowed a
reasonable period in which to dispose of it, in a normal manner at its
market value. In the case of ships and shares therein, however, a specially limited period may be prescribed.
2. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national
treatment within the territories of the other Party with respect to acquiring, by purchase, lease or otherwise, and with respect to owning
and disposing of, personal property of all kinds, both tangible and
intangible ....
3. Except as provided in paragraph 1 of the present Article, the ownership of real property within the territories of each Party shall be
subject to the applicable laws therein. Nationals and companies of
either Party shall, however, be permitted to possess and occupy real
property within the territories of the other Party, incidental to or
necessary for the enjoyment of rights secured by the provisions of the
present Treaty. [1950] 1 U.S.T. 788, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 art. VII.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1
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cept in so far as possession and occupation thereof may be incidental to
enjoyment of rights otherwise provided in the treaty.
The 1957 treaty with the Netherlands, 12 5 a civil law country which
itself does not restrict alien ownership of land as such though investments in land may be subject to regulation,1 26 affords economic, cultural,
and institutional rights similar to those described in the Irish treaty
above. Article VII, however, after providing general freedom of establishment, contains the following language: "2. Each party reserves the
right to limit the extent to which aliens may within its territories establish, acquire interests in, or carry on enterprises engaged in ... the
exploitation of land or other natural resources.... ." Article VIII of this
treaty, dealing with ownership of property, also contains provisions
similar to the treaty with Ireland.
The friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, therefore, would
make two principal changes in the common law or standard alien land
laws. Nonresident nationals of a treaty state would be entitled to realize
the market value of land claimed by succession, rather than being
excluded from inheritance altogether. 127 Such nonresident nationals
also would be entitled to lease and occupy premises appropriate to the
economic or cultural activities authorized by the treaty. A limitation on
the acquisition of agricultural land by nonresident aliens, such as that
proposed in Missouri and already in effect in a number of states, 12 s
would be unaffected by treaties reserving the right to restrict exploitation of land and natural resources.
B. Preemption by Federal Legislation
The federal government's predominant authority in foreign affairs
makes that field especially susceptible to a finding that comprehensive
federal legislation precludes even state laws which may be technically
consistent with a federal statute. When the issues involved come within
the area of immigration and naturalization, the Supreme Court has been
most unsympathetic to state legislation. The leading cases in this area
have been Hines v. Davidowitz, 2 9 which held a state alien registration law
30
invalid in the face of the federal provision, and Pennsylvania v. Nelson,'

125. [1957] 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
126. See [1972] 3 COMMON MARKET REP. (CCH) 26,653. Among European
countries substantial restrictions on alien ownership of land are imposed by Swit29,153, 30,929 (since relaxed) and
zerland, [1972] 3 COMMON MARKET REP.
Sweden, see Bogdan, Restrictions Limiting the Right of Foreigners to Acquire Real
Property in Sweden, 41 RABELS ZEITSCHPFr 536 (1977).
127. See Hanafin v. McCarthy, 95 N.H. 36, 57 A.2d 148 (1948) (1889 treaty
with Great Britain).
128. See statutes cited notes 22 & 23 supra.

129. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
130. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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which struck down a state sedition law as preempted by the federal
Smith Act.
The comprehensive and constitutionally mandated federal system of
immigration and naturalization laws was, in fact, a principal alternative
basis for invalidation of the state restrictions on resident aliens, at least
in the earlier cases Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission 3 and Graham v.
Richardson.132 State limitations on the ability of an alien to earn a living
after the federal government has permitted him to establish permanent
residence in the United States were said to conflict with those decisions.
This concept is also discernible as a factor in the decisions invalidating
1 33
the ineligible-alien land laws.
The recent decision of De Canas v. Bica,134 which sustained a
California law prohibiting employment of illegal aliens, probably does
not presage a significant relaxation of this view., The Court strongly emphasized the fact that the effect of the state law was simply to enlist state
authorities in the implementation of federal policy, and, unlike the regulations in Hines and Nelson, imposed no new burdens on persons authorized to enter and reside in the country.
Limitations on nonresident aliens do not appear to invade the immigration and naturalization field directly, or otherwise to conflict with
current federal law, which contains no comprehensive regulation of
foreign investment. The direct preemption doctrine therefore poses no
immediate threat to Missouri's statute.
C. Constitutional Preemption-Interference with Foreign Relations
As early as 1853, the Vermont Supreme Court expressed the view
that alienage and the consequences of that status are the exclusive concern of the federal government:
[I]t seems ... that the right to interfere with aliens holding real
estate in this country, strictly and appropriately belongs to the
national, and not to the State sovereignty. It goes upon the
basis of some defect in allegiance; and allegiance is a matter
pertaining altogether to the national sovereignty. They have the
exclusive control of all relations between this country and
foreign nations, or their citizens. And the States are expressly
prohibited, in the United States Constitution, from attempting
135
any stipulations, treaties or compacts, upon the subject ....
It was not until 1968, however, that the United States Supreme Court
first articulated the principle that state laws may be invalidated solely
because they constitute "an intrusion by the State into the field of
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971).
See cases cited notes 90-92 supra.
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
State v. Boston, C. & M.R.R. 25 Vt. 432, 439 (1853).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/1

18

1978]

Fisch: Fisch: State Regulation of Alien Land Ownership
ALIEN LAND OWNERSHIP

foreign affairs."1 3 6 Because Zschernig v. Miller1 3 7 involved that particular form of alien land law known as the "Iron Curtain Statute," it assumes special importance in this discussion.
Zschernig declared invalid an Oregon statute which conditioned a
nonresident alien's right to take property by succession on a showing
that the claimant's country afforded reciprocal rights to United States
citizens, and that the claimant would have the right to receive the property without confiscation. The Court did not disturb the holding in Clark
v. Allen 138 that a general reciprocity statute is not per se invalid. It did
find, however, that the actual judicial administration of statutes like
Oregon's involved
inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular
foreign nations-whether aliens under their laws have enforceable rights, whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials,
whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other
representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good
faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the 3 par9
ticular foreign system of law any element of confiscation.1
By contrast, in Clark v. Allen the statute "seemed to involve no more than
a routine reading of foreign laws." 140 The more extensive inquiry into
administration, however, invades the field of foreign affairs. "As one
reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that foreign policy attitudes, the
freezing or thawing of the 'cold war,' and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the Federal Government, not
for local probate courts." 141
In the light of this rationale, state and federal courts on at least
three occasions have invalidated similar statutes. In two of those, how'ever, it was emphasized that the statute as applied involved more than a
"routine reading" of the foreign law. In Mora v. Battin 142 the statute
required withholding the distribution of legacies to alien beneficiaries if
they would not receive the benefit, use, or control of the money "because of circumstances prevailing at the place of residence of such
legatee ..... " The court found that this language compelled inquiry into
the operations of the foreign government, and that had in fact been
done:
The affidavits establish that the defendant's refusal to distribute
136. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). For the view that this is

"new constitutional doctrine," see L.
STITtUTION 239 (1972).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CON-

389 U.S. 429 (1968).
331 U.S. 503 (1947).
389 U.S. at 434.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 437-38.
303 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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the assets in question to the plaintiffs was based on a consideration of matters other than the statute law of Czechoslovakia.
Such a construction and application of [the statute] is prohibited43 under the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller.1

In In re Estate of Kraemer 144 the same California statute which had been
sustained in Clark v. Allen was invalidated. It is significant that Justice
Douglas noted in a footnote to his Zschernig opinion that post-Clark
California decisions would have presented the same problems as the
Oregon cases. 1 45 A concurring opinion in Kraemer stated the distinction
between "routine reading" and forbidden inquiry:
[Zschernig] would not condemn [the statute] if, under it, all that
could be done by local trial courts, to determine if the other
country involved treated its own citizens and nonresident
United States citizens alike, was to read the applicable written
law of that country (presumably through an authenticated
translation) and possibly hear expert interpretive testimony
where the credibility of the foreign expert was not put into
question. However, if, through legislative language or through
subsisting court interpretation, trial court inquiry into how the
law is administered (such as to learn that officials and the
courts of the country do not interpret its inheritance statute
literally and sanction discrimination against nonresident United
States citizens)46 is allowed, then the code section is disapproved
by Zschernig.1

Only Pennsylvania appears to have invalidated its statute "on its face"
without inquiry into application.1 47 The majority of post-Zschernig decisions, on the other hand, have held such statutes valid where no
"animadversions" are required and indeed have found that most East
1 48
European countries satisfy the statutory requirements.
If a statute discriminates against aliens as a class, but does not require investigation of the administration of the laws of a particular
foreign country or otherwise single out any country for judicial criticism,
the application of the Zschernig case is problematical. To be sure, the
California appellate court in Bethelehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners 149 invalidated the California "Buy American Act," which required

143. Id. at 664.
144. 276 Cal. App. 2d 715, 81 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1969).
145. 389 U.S. at 433 n.5.
146. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 725, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 295 (Reppy, J., concurring).
147. Demczuk Estate, 444 Pa. 212, 282 A.2d 700 (1971).
148. E.g., Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Estate of
Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968); In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239
N.E.2d 550 (1968), appeal dismissedfor want offinality, 397 U.S. 148 (1970); In re
Johnston, 16 N.C. App. 38, 190 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. App. 1972). See Comment, The
Demise of the "Iron Curtain" Statute, 18 ViLL. L. REv. 49 (1972).
149. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
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public construction contracts to be let only to persons agreeing to use or
supply American-made materials. The court held that the statute had a
"direct impact on foreign relations" and found Zschernig controlling.
However, in 1977 the Supreme Court of New Jersey took the opposite
view in K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission,1 5 0 sustaining an essentially similar New Jersey statute. That
court found no foreign policy or ideological attitudes implicit in the law,
policies of the seller, and held
nor any distinction based on the1 5internal
1
Zschernig therefore inapplicable.
The most that can be said of Zschernig and its limited progeny is that
they afford some basis for argument that any state law which discriminates against aliens, especially aliens not resident in the United States,
constitutes an impermissible intrusion into foreign affairs. 1 52 The
opinion of Justice Douglas in Zschernig, however, does not so hold. The
case does make clear that a law which directly discriminates against particular nations, and thus impinges on our relations with those nations,
must be presumed invalid. To that extent it also might be argued that a
provision specially favoring particular nations is also invalid-for example, the provision in the original Missouri Senate Bill 685 which would
have exempted citizens of Canada from the definition of "alien." 153
V.

CONCLUSION

Today's alien land law is directed at the foreign investor, rather
than the unassimilated immigrant. It seems clear that the federal Constitution would preclude any such law aimed at residents of the United
States. However, the authorities provide less protection (or at least less
clear-cut protection) for the nonresident who wishes simply to make a
capital investment in land. In all probability, neither the due process
clause nor the typical treaty would bar enforcement of a state law limiting investment in land other than that appropriate to a nonagricultural,
nonextractive commercial or industrial enterprise. The application of the
strict scrutiny test of the equal protection clause is at least open to serious question.
The strongest argument for the invalidity of statutes such as those
of Minnesota and Missouri would seem to be that they constitute an impermissible intrusion into the conduct of foreign relations. However, to
the extent that the effect on foreign relations is diffuse and incidental,
150. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
151. 381 A.2d at 783-84.
152. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 650; Note, Alien Inheritance Statutes: An
Examination of the Constitutionality of State Laws Restricting the Rights of Nonresident
Aliens to Inherit from American Decedents, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 597, 621-22 (1974).
153. Senate Substitute for S. 685, 79th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978), as
originally perfected by the Senate, Feb. 28, 1978. This provision was eliminated
by the House from the final bill.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

and the statute refrains from discriminating against particular countries,
the existing cases can be distinguished, and that argument loses much of
its technical support. The United States Supreme Court's long tolerance
of many forms of alien land law and other courts' narrow interpretation
of the Zschernig principle must leave considerable doubt that the Court
would invalidate these statutes.
The most obvious answer to these problems would be the establishment, by express legislation, of a uniform national policy with respect to
foreign investment, thereby preempting such state laws. Pending such
action by Congress, however, it is commended to other courts the century-old wisdom of the Vermont Supreme Court in concluding that the
status of alien is one which concerns only the federal government.

APPENDIX
Senate Substitute for S. 685, 79th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1978)
provides:
Section 1. Section 442.560, RSMo 1969, is repealed and seven new
sections are enacted in lieu thereof to be known as sections 442.560, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, and 7, to read as follows:
442.560. Except as provided in this act, persons not citizens of the
United States and not residents of the United States or of some territory,
trusteeship, or protectorate of the United States, and corporations not
created by or under the laws of the United States or of some state, territory, trusteeship, or protectorate of the United States shall be capable
of acquiring, by grant, purchase, devise or descent, real estate except
agricultural land as defined in section 2 of this act, or any interest
therein, in this state, and of owning, holding, devising, or alienating the
same, and shall incur the like duties and liabilities in relation thereto as
if they were citizens of the United States and residents of this state.
Section 2. As used in this act unless the context clearly requires
otherwise the following terms mean:
(1) "Agricultural Land", any tract of land in this state consisting of
more than 5 acres, whether inside or outside the corporate limits of any
municipality, which is capable, without substantial modification to the
character of the land, of supporting an agricultural enterprise, including, but not limited to land used for the production of agricultural crops
or fruit or other horticultural products, or for the raising or feeding of
animals for the production of livestock or livestock products, poultry or
poultry products, or milk or dairy products. Adjacent parcels of land
under the same ownership shall be deemed to be a single tract;
(2) "Alien", any person who is not a citizen of the United States and
who is not a resident of the United States or of some state, territory,
trusteeship, or protectorate of the United States;
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(3) "Director", the director of the Missouri department of agriculture;
(4) "Foreign Business", any business entity whether or not incorporated, including but not limited to corporations, partnerships, limited
partnerships, and associations, in which a controlling interest is owned
by aliens. In determining ownership of a foreign business legal fictions
such as corporate form or trust shall be disregarded;
(5) "Residence", means the place of general abode; the place of
general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in
fact, where he intends to remain permanently or for an indefinite period
of time at least.
Section 3. 1. Except as provided in section 6 and section 7 of this
act, no alien or foreign business shall acquire by grant, purchase, devise,
descent or otherwise agricultural land in this state. No person may hold
agricultural land as an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary for an alien or
foreign business.
2. Any alien or foreign business who acquires agricultural land in
violation of this act remains in violation of this act for as long as he
holds an interest in the land.
Section 4. 1. If the director finds that an alien or foreign business
or an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary therefor has acquired agricultural
land in Missouri after the effective date of this act or the land ceases to
be used for non-agricultural purposes under Section 7 of this act, he
shall report the violation to the attorney general.
2. The attorney general shall institute an action in the circuit court
of Cole County or the circuit court in any county in which agricultural
land owned by the alien or foreign business, agent, trustee or other
fiduciary, alleged to hav6 violated this act, is located.
3. The attorney general shall file a notice of the pendency of the
action with the recorder of deeds of each county in which any portion of
such agricultural lands are located. If the court finds that the lands in
question have been acquired in violation of this act, it shall enter an
order so declaring and shall file a copy of the order with the recorder of
deeds of each county in which any portion of the agricultural lands are
located. The court shall order the owner to divest himself of the agricultural land. The owner must comply with the order within two years.
The two year limitation period shall be a covenant running with the title
to the land against any alien grantee or assignee. Provided, however, an
incorporated foreign business must divest itself of agricultural land
within the minimum time required by Article XI, Section 5, of the Missouri constitution. Any agricultural lands not divested within the time
prescribed shall be ordered sold by the court at a public sale in the
manner prescribed by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate for default in payment.
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Section 5. Any person who obtains a lease on agricultural land for a
term of ten years or longer or a lease renewable at his option for terms
which might total ten years has acquired agricultural land within the
meaning of this act.
Section 6. This act shall not apply to agricultural land now owned
in this state by aliens or foreign businesses so long as it is held by the
present owners, nor to any alien who is or shall take up bona fide residence in the United States; and any alien who is or shall become a bona
fide resident of the United States shall have the right to acquire and
hold agricultural lands in this state upon the same terms as citizens of
the United States during the continuance of such bona fide residence in
the United States; except, that if any resident alien shall cease to be a
bona fide resident of the United States, such alien shall have 2 years
from the time he ceased to be a bona fide resident in which to divest
himself of such agricultural lands. Any agricultural lands not divested
within the time prescribed shall be ordered sold by the court at a public
sale in the manner prescribed by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage
on real estate for default in payment.
Section 7. 1. The restrictions set forth in this act shall not apply to
agricultural land or any interest therein acquired by an alien or foreign
business for immediate or potential use in non-farming purposes. An
alien or foreign business may hold such agricultural land in such acreage
as may be necessary to its nonfarm business operation; provided, however, that pending the development of agricultural land for nonfarm
purposes, such land may not be used for farming except under lease to
a family farm unit; a family farm corporation defined in 350.010 RSMo
1975 Supp.; an alien or foreign business which has filed with the director under this act; or except when controlled through ownership, options, leaseholds or other agreements by a corporation which has entered
into an agreement with the United States of America pursuant to the
New Community Act of 1968 (Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 3901-3914) as amended, or a subsidiary or assign of such a corporation.
2. Any alien or foreign business which acquires an interest in agricultural land, for the purposes outlined in this section shall file with
the director a declaration of intent as to the intended use of the land,
the owner's name and a legal description of the land acquired. Such
filings shall be made within sixty days of acquiring such land.
3. Regardless of any provision of Section 1.140 RSMo to the contrary, if any separate provision of this act shall be found unconstitutional
by a competent court of law, all other provisions of this act shall be
deemed unconstitutional.
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